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DIGITAL SAMPLING: CREATIVE OR
JUST PLAIN "CHEEZ-OID?"1
Digital recording technology was introduced to the music
industry during the early 1970's,2 and became popular about ten
years later.3 During the digital sampling process, sounds are taken
from a source, either live or recorded, and encoded m binary bits
into the computer sampler's memory 4 The samples can then be
edited and stored on floppy disk or hard drive.5 A musician can
use a library of samples to create virtually any type of recording
instead of hiring individual instrumentalists to play each part.6
While digital sampling technology is an extremely useful tool
for many musicians and producers,7 a large number of musicians
feel threatened by it.' In addition, this technology, which allows
musicians to lift entire phrases from recordings, presents a unique
challenge to copyright law Although portions of a recording are
often "stolen," these samples can be altered beyond recognition.9
1. Robert Tomsho, As Sampling Revolutionizes Recording, Debate Grows Over
Aesthetics, Copyrights, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at Bi, B4, (quoting Frank Zappa,
expressing Is distaste for unauthorized digital sampling).. The term "cheez-oid," or
"cheese-oid" according to the Tomsho article, appears to be derived from the expression
"cheesy," which indicates that somethng is inferior or cheap. See THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY 353 (2d ed. 1987).
2. JOHN EARGLE, HANDBOOK OF RECORDING ENGINEERING 315 (2d ed. 1992). Nippon
Columbia Company introduced an eight-channel digital converter in 1972. Id.
3. For an explanation of the development of digital sampling and its increased popu-
larity, see generally Molly McGraw, Sound Sampling Protection and Infringement in
Today's Music Industry, 4 HIGH TECH. L. . 147, 149-50 (1989).
4. For a more complete description of the digital sampling process, see CHARIES
DODGE & THOMAS A. JERSE, COMPUTER MUSIC: SYNTHESIS, COMPOSITION AND PERFOR-
MANCE 25-31 (1985).
5. McGraw, supra note 3, at 150.
6. Id. at 152.
7. Digital sampling technology can save time and money during the recording process.
It also affords producers and musicians a great deal of flexibility. See Tomsho, supra note
1, at BI (describing how a single digital sampling instrument can recreate an entire or-
chestra).
8. See infra notes 30-58 and accompanying text; see also H.P. NEWQUIST, MUSIC
AND TECHNOLOGY 124 (1989) (discussing fears that musicians whose instruments are
easily sampled will be put out of business).
9. See generally id. at 147-58 (explaining different types of signal processing and
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Many musicians view old recordings as a source of raw material.
The producers of the recordings being sampled maintain that they
are harmed by these new uses of their recordings.'
This note addresses the copyright concerns arising from the
development of digital sampling technology and concludes that
copyright law should be amended to accommodate the special
needs of this technology Part I explains the technology of digital
sampling and introduces the issues surrounding it. Part II focuses
on copyright law and protection of sound recordings from unautho-
rized sampling under existing law. Part IMI discusses defenses avail-
able to a musician accused of unauthorized sampling of a sound
recording under current law Part IV addresses the need for new
copyright legislation addressing digital sampling. Part V proposes
new copyright legislation and discusses this proposed legislation m
light of the various goals and justifications of copyright.
I. DIGITAL SAMPLING
A. The Technology
In order to understand the controversy surrounding digital
sampling, it is helpful to understand the technology In analog
recording, the type of recording used most frequently by consum-
ers, the movement of the air which humans perceive as sound is
translated through an instrument such as a microphone into electric
current called voltage." This current is sent to tape deck
heads.'2 When oxide coated tape passes over the heads, the
changes in voltage cause the oxide particles to rearrange, thus
magnetically encoding the tape for later playback. 3
Digital recording is a similar process. In digital recording, like
analog recording, a sound is captured by a microphone and turned
ther uses which may allow for significant alteration of the original sound recorded).
10. See Tomsho, supra note i, at BI (describing steps taken by representatives of
singer/musician James Brown to prevent unauthorized use of original recordings).
11. For a technical description of microphone operation, see generally EARGLE, supra
note 2, § 2, at 43-69.
12. For a technical description of analog magnetic recording, see generally 1d. § 9.1-
9.4, at 296-306.
13. NEWQUIST, supra note 8, at 174.
The playback process is essentially the reverse. The signals recorded on the tape are
turned back into electric signals by the playback head. Id. These signals are sent to an
amplifier to be boosted, then on to a loudspeaker where they are turned back into vibra-
tions by the speaker cone. Id.
1264 [Vol. 42:1261
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into an electric current. 4 Instead of becoming a magnetic signal,
however, the sound is converted to a binary code.'5 During the
conversion process, the computer analyzes the sound wave at a
particular period in time. The sound wave is assigned a numerical
value at each of these discreet times.1 6 In order to produce an
accurate reproduction of a sound, the sound must be analyzed or
sampled around 50,000 times per second. 17 Digital technology al-
lows virtually identical copies of a sound to be created and repro-
duced relatively easily "s Digital technology is said to be superior
to analog recording because of its accuracy of reproduction and
lack of extraneous noise. 9
Digital technology has had a very profound effect on the
recording industry20 This note addresses the copyright concerns
resulting from the use of one particular type of digital technology,
namely the digital sampler. Digital samplers allow a musician or
producer to reproduce a sound with amazing clarity2" A digital
"sampler" is basically a simplified version of the digital tape decks
used in recording studios.' Samplers record sounds through the
same sampling process as a studio deck, but are limited in the
amount of material they are capable of storing.23
With a digital sampler, a musician can "sample" a sound from
either a live source or a pre-recorded source, such as a digital
audio tape (DAT), compact disc (CD) or tape.24 Sampling is mak-
ing a short digital recording of a sound.25 Once the sounds have
been-encoded into binary bits, the samples can be edited or other-
wise altered to change their sound.26 The samples can then be
stored on floppy disk or the hard drive of a computer.27 These
14. Id. at 183-187.
15. Tins process is known as "sampling." NEWQUnST, supra note 8, at 184.
16. For a more detailed descnption of the sampling process, see DODGE & JERSE,
supra note 4, at 25-31.
17. See EARGLE, supra note 2, § 11.3, at 363.
18. DODGE & JERSE, supra note 4, at 31.
19. Id. at 31.
20. See Tonsho, supra note 1, at B1.
21. Id.
22. See NEWQUIsT, supra note 8, at 184.
23. Id.
24. Id.; Don Snowden, Sampling: A Creative Tool or License to Steal?, L.A. TIEs,
Aug. 6, 1989, at 61.
25. Id. (describes sampling as the recording of a sound or "an event").
26. NEWQUIST, supra note 8, at 184.
27. Curtis Roads, Introduction in CoMPosERS AND THE COMPUTER xii (Curtis Roads,
ed. 1985).
12651992]
1266 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1261
samples vary in length from milliseconds to a few minutes depend-
mg on the sampler's memory capacity,28 with an average length
of a few seconds.29
B. The Debate
The use of electronic instruments to replace certain musicians
is not a new phenomenon.3" Since the mid-1960's, synthesizers
have been used in recording sessions to replace live musicians and
to create new sounds. 3' Digital sampling, however, presents a new
problem for musicians because a virtually perfect recording of the
actual sound is at a musician's fingertips, not a synthesized or
"mimicked" version of it.32
The ease of digital sampling and its pervasiveness in the re-
cording industry has many musicians concerned.33 The controversy
surrounding digital sampling extends to both sampling of preexist-
ing sound recordings and sampling of live musicians. 4 This note
addresses only the former.
When existing recordings are sampled, a portion of the record-
ing is literally copied from a CD or tape. Some artists, rap groups
for example, then take this sample and use it virtually "verbatim"
as background for a new song.35 Rap artist Vanilla Ice3 6 did ex-
actly this. Vanilla Ice sampled a portion of the bass guitar line
from the Queen recording of the David Bowie composition Under
Pressure37 and used it for the bass line of his own song, Ice, Ice
Baby.38
28. Jeffrey S. Newton, Digital Sampling: The Copyright Considerations of a New Tech-
nological Use of Musical Performance, II HASTINGS Comm./ENT. L.J. 671, 673 (1989);
Snowden, supra note 24, at 61.
29. E. Scott Johnson, Protecting Distinctive Sounds: The Challenge of Digital Sampling,
m ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 153 (John David Viera et al.,
eds. 1988).
30. Id. at 154.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 153-54; see also NEWQUIST, supra note 8, at 112 (describing the limitations
of analog synthesis).
33. Tomsho, supra note 1, at B1.
34. See Jonathan L. Kirk, Whose Music is it?, 9 CALIF. LAWYER 28 (Sept. 1989) (de-
scribing the legal problems inherent in digital sampling).
35. Tomsho, supra note 1, at B4.
36. Vanilla Ice is a controversial rap artist. See generally VANILLA ICE, ICE BY ICE
(1991) (autobiography of Vanilla Ice discussing his life and the controversies surrounding
Is rise to fame).
37. QUEEN, Under Pressure, on HOT SPACE (Elektra 1982).
38. VANILLA ICE, Ice, Ice Baby, on To THE EXTREME (SBK Records 1990). Ice was
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Other groups, like Art of Noise, take samples and use them m
a musical collage setting. 9 This use of digital sampling has its
roots back in the late 1940's. During the late 1940's and early
1950's, recording engineers Louis and Bebe Barron collaborated
with composer John Cage to create musical works by editing mag-
netic tape.' The composers would edit recordings of various in-
struments by playing portions backwards, removing portions and
juxtaposing segments of the recordings.41 George Martin, producer
of the Beatles, also experimented with editing analog tapes to
create new effects during the late 1960's. Martin, with the help of
a recording engineer, created a collage of steam organ sounds by
cutting tapes of organ music into segments, then splicing them
back together in a random order.42
Another common practice is to sample only one instrument
from a recording, a snare drum or a bass, for example, and use
that sample in lieu of using an acoustic instrument to create the
sound.43 For example, during the mid-1980's, Phil Collins' snare
drum sound was very popular.' Artists sampled this sound to use
either during live performances or in their own recordings.4
5
These practices disturb musicians for several reasons. Many
musicians resent having spent years developing a personal style,
only to have it become commonplace as a result of continuous
sampling of their recordings. 46 If a sound is sampled from a re-
accused of sampling a portion of Under Pressure and, after a lawsuit was threatened,
gave Bowie and Queen composer credits. Guy Garcia, Play It Again, Sampler, TIME, June
3, 1991, at 69.
39. For examples of the style exemplified by Art of Noise, see ART OF NOISE, IN
VISIBLE SILENCE (China Records 1988).
40. Peter Manmng, ELECTRONIC AND COMPUTER MUSIC (1985).
41. Id.
42. This process was used during the recording of the SGT. PEPPER album, for the
song Being for the Benefit of Mr. Kite. Kirk, supra note 34, at 28.
43. Tis particular practice is controversial because many musicians fear that their
acoustical instruments will be completely replaced by digital samplers. NEWQUIsT, supra
note 8, at 124. Substitution of sampling for acoustical instruments has been a concern
since drum machines became popular in the early 1980's. Id. It is arguable that prpducers
and engineers might prefer to work with live musicians and that a machine cannot per-
form with the same expression as a live musician. Although this issue is very important,
it cannot be addressed within the scope of tlus note. For additional commentary on
musicians' fear of being replaced by sampling, see id. at 124.
44. Id. at 126.
45. Id.
46. For example, Phil Collins' signature snare drum sound was a snare drum with
gated reverberation. Id. at 126. The irony of the controversy surrounding the heavy sam-
pling of Collins' sound is that Collins himself sampled the sound from a drum machine.
126719921
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cording, it can be used in a variety of ways without the consent of
the artist. Nonetheless, some artists feel that they have a "moral
right" to control how their works are used.4 7
Artistic control aside, many musicians object to sampling for
economic reasons. 48 Using sampling, an entire symphony orchestra
could conceivably be replaced.49 Some producers may find the
ability to reduce production costs and to increase creativity and
flexibility through digital technology irresistible." Samples can be
stored for later productions or bought and sold like commodi-
ties.5 Many musicians worry that digital technology will soon
replace acoustic instrumentalists.52
Proponents of digital sampling, however, feel that sampling
encourages creativity,53 and is less expensive than hiring individu-
al musicians to play each part.5 4 With the use of MIDI,55 musi-
See id. at 126.
47. See generally Thomas C. Moglovkin, Note, Original Digital. No More Free Sam-
ples, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 170 (1990) (describing moral rights and their application
to the digital sampling context).
Control under the moral rights theory need not necessarily be achieved through copy-
right law. Some states, New York, for example, have state law which prevents certain
uses of an artist's work without consent. See Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n.,
745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that a "decency" organization's use of an
artist's photographs in an edited fashion, out of their original context, violated a New
York state statute, but did not go so far as to constitute defamation). These states have
legislated a form of moral rights, independent of copyright law. See Moglovkin, supra, at
171 n.220 (discussing the unlikelihood of widespread state legislation of moral rights to
complement U.S. copyright law).
48. See Bruce J. McGivenn, Note, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity:
Protecting Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723,
1726 (1987) (explaining the possibility that synthesizer players could "undersell acoustic
talent" through the use of digital sampling).
49. Tomsho, supra note 1, at B4.
50. Johnson, supra note 29, at 154.
51. See NEWQUIST, supra note 8, at 123 (discussing pre-recorded sample libraries).
52. Tomsho, supra note 1, at B4 (discussing the concerns of the musicians' union
about lost work and lost royalties caused by digital sampling).
53. See Steven R. Gordon & Charles J. Sanders, The Rap on Digital Sampling: Theft,
Innovation, or What?, in ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLSHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 207,
209 (1989) (explaining the view of digital sampling proponents that the prohibition of
sampling would have "a severe chilling effect" on the development of new music, par-
ticularly rap).
54. McGivern, supra note 48, at 1726.
55. MIDI (Musical Instrument Digital Interface) is a system which allows many elec-
tronic instruments to be "locked" together for control and flexibility. MIDI allows an
analog signal (from an instrument such as an electric musical instrument or a microphone,
which would convert any sound it could pick up into an analog signal) to be converted
into a digital signal that can then be used and manipulated by a digital instrument, i.e., a
computer. See DAVID BASKERVILLE, Music BUSINESs HANDBOOK CAREER GUIDE 212 (4th
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clans and producers have flexibility and control not possible with a
room full of musicians. Sampling allows a producer to record a
sound such as a background vocal only once, and then insert this
sound at various places in the recording.56
Sampling proponents argue that even the sampling of substan-
tial portions of existing records does not harm the original artists.
Rather, proponents argue that these uses are a form of "homage" to
the original artists. 7 Further, proponents claim that the use of the
samples does not harm the original artist economically, and may
even bolster sales of the original recording."
The recording industry and the legal community are faced
with a difficult policy decision. Digital technology requires a bal-
ancing of the interests of artists in retaining artistic and economic
control over their works against the interests of artists in having
access to raw material for use in creative works. Legislation is
needed to define what types of sampling will be allowed, in what
manner these samples may be used, and to what extent the use
should be permitted.59
ed. 1985). A sequencer, one of the MIDI instruments, is used as a sort of a "traffic cop
m the mapping-out process." Snowden, supra note 24, at 61. The sequencer assigns the
sounds to specific keys on the keyboard and routes the signals to the correct places at
the proper times. See id.
56. Id.
This creativity and flexibility was not readily obtainable with analog recording tech-
mques. For example, when George Martin created the wash of organ music for the
Beatles' Being for the Benefit of Mr. Kite, the engineer had to physically cut the tape
apart and splice it together in a different order. BEATLES, Being for the Benefit of Mr.
Kite, on SGT. PEPPER'S LONELY HEART'S CLUB BAND (EMI Records 1967); KIRK, supra
note 34, at 28.
Actually cutting and splicing tapes is not very precise. EARGLE, supra note 2, §
11.1, at 358. For Martin's purposes, the order of the splices was random. KIRK, supra
note 34, at 28. If Martin had wanted the splices in certain places, the process would have
been very difficult and time-consuming, considenng the number of edits. Digital technolo-
gy involves no physical cutting and splicing of the recording; all editing and mixing are
done electronically. See Jean-Claude Risset, Digital Techniques and Sound Structure in
Music, in COMPOSERS AND THE COMPUTER, supra note 27, at 113 (describing the mixing
and editing process of his piece MIRAGES). For a more technical descnption of the digital
editing process, see EARGLE, supra note 2, § 11.6, at 368-72.
57. Gordon & Sanders, supra note 53, at 209. Some artists consider frequent sampling
of their work to be a great honor. Weekend Edition: Rap Uses Electronics, Pre-Recorded
Sound (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 18, 1992).
58. Id. The same argument has been made in support of permitting photocopying of
literary works. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 235 (1970)
(argwng that by allowing photocopying of journals, publishers will not necessarily be
injured because photocopying may increase interest in the journal and publishers can raise
prices to make up for declining subscriptions).
59. See generally Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for Fair Pay, 105
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II. COPYRIGHT LAW ANS DIGITAL SAMPLING
A. Statutory Law
1. Constitutional Provision and Policies of Copyright
The United States Constitution provides for copyright protec-
tion. Through the Constitution, Congress is empowered "[t]o pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limit-
ed times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re-
spective writings and discoveries." ' As a result of this provision,
Congress is permitted to grant copyright owners a "limited monop-
oly" over their work.61
The limited monopoly permitted by copyright law is a means
to an end.62 When a copyright is granted to an author, that person
is able to "secure a fair return" for the "creative labor" expend-
ed.63 For the artist, the primary benefit of obtaining a copyright
for an artistic work is an economic one. 64 The artist is given cer-
tain exclusive rights for a limited period of time.65 The use of
this limited monopoly, however, is a means of obtaining the goal
of copyright: "to stimulate artistic creativity for public good."6
The public good is promoted because artists are provided with an
incentive to continue creating.67 These creative works are then ac-
cessible to the public after the artist has had a sufficient time to
maximize his or her economic benefits.68
HARV. L. REV. 726 (1992) (discussing the need for legislation to solve the sampling
copyright dilemma and proposing a compulsory licensing scheme as a possible solution).
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
61. See generally Scott L Bach, Note, Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory
Licenses: Toward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 380-84 (1986)
(describing the limited monopoly policy of copyright law).
62. Michael F. Sitzer, Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audi-
ence Reactions ui Determining Substantial Similariy, 54 S. CAL L. REV. 385, 391-92
(1981).
63. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
64. Sitzer, supra note 62, at 392 ("[C]opyright protection does not exist for the gratifi-
cation of the artist's ego; it exists for the gratification of the artist's pocketbook.").
65. Bach, supra note 61, at 382. Copyright law provides the creator with a 'bundle of
rights, but protects only the author's creation, not the underlying ideas or principles. Id.
Tus 'bundle of rights' includes the right to reproduce and distribute the work and the
right to prepare derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
66. See Twentieth Century, 422 U.S. at 156.
67. Id.
68. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
1270 [Vol. 42:1261
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2. The Copyright Act of 1976
Although recording technology has been around since the late
nineteenth century,"' sound recordings were not entitled to copy-
right protection until 1972. The Sound Recording Amendment of
1971 offered the first federal protection of recorded perfor-
mance.70  This amendment provided protection for sound record-
ings "fixed" between February 15, 1972 and December 31,
1974.71 The Copyright Act of 197672 now protects sound record-
rngs "fixed" on or after February 15, 1972. 7a
Copyright owners of sound recordings have the right to repro-
duce, distribute and prepare derivative works of the copyrighted
recording.74 The protection of a copyright owner is limited to pro-
tection against sound recordings "that directly or indirectly recap-
ture the actual sounds fixed in the recording." 75 This limitation
means that there is no protection against simulated recordings con-
sisting solely of an "independent fixation" of sounds. 6
(recognizing that copyright law serves a public need by allowing public access after the
period of the artist's exclusive control is over); see also Twentieth Century, 422 U.S. at
156 ("The ultimate aim [of copyright law] is to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.").
69. Thomas Edison invented the first recorder, the cylinder recorder, in 1877.
BASKEI RVILLE supra note 55, at 251. For a history of recording technology, see id. at
251-53.
70. WIMLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 146 (6th ed. 1986).
71. Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391, 392 (1971) (amended 1976); PATRY, supra
note 70, at 209; see also NEWTON, supra note 28, at 699-700 (explaining that sound
recording protection resulted from an explosion of record piracy during the late 1960"s
and early 1970's).
Congress removed the 1974 deadline before it would have expired. Act of Dec. 31,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 101, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (amended 1976); PATRY, supra
note 70, at 209.
72. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976), codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914
(1988).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c).
74. Id. § 106(1)-(3). It is also important to note that the Copyright Act specifically
denies owners of copyrights for sound recordings a performance right. Id. § 114(a).
75. Id. § 114(b).
76. Id. Because there is no protection against simulated recording comprised of an
independent fixation of sounds, an artist is permitted, under copyright law, to make a
recording that sounds like another recording, provided the sound alike is a completely
new recording and does not use the recorded sounds of the original. See id. §§ 106, 114;
see also Note, A Cause of Action for Simulation of Sound Recordings? Yes!: Reflections
on the 1976 Copyright Act, 38 RurTERS L. REV. 139 (1985) (proposing that Congress
enact legislation limiting the right to produce simulated sound recordings)
Although there is no cause of action for an artist against a sound alike under copy-
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
It seems that digital sampling would be explicitly proscribed
by the copyright act. After all, digital samples "directly or indirect-
ly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording," 7 and the
samples are not entirely "independent fixation[s]" of new
sounds.78 Congress, however, has not prohibited all copying. The
House Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976 states that
"infringement takes place whenever all or any substantial portion
of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted sound re-
cording are reproduced by repressing, transcribing, recapturing
off the air, or any other method."79 The report indicates that the
purpose of the statute was to protect "substantial portions" of a
copyrighted piece, rather than individual notes.80 Digital sampling
technology was not readily available at the time this report was
released.
B. Proving Infringement
In order to prove an infringement of a copyrighted sound
recording under present law, a plaintiff must show three things:
ownership, direct copying, and materiality of the copying.8'
1. Ownership
Ownership of the copyright is the first element of infringement
that a plaintiff is required to show Initial ownership of the copy-
right is granted to the "author or authors of the work."82 The au-
thors of a sound recording often include the performer, engineer
and producer.8 3 In reality, however, the artist seldom owns an
I
right law, the artist may have recourse under other theories such as right of publicity,
defamation, or unfair competition. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that a sound alike commercial violated Midler's right of publicity and
that the imitation of Midler's voice was a misappropriation); see also Gordon & Sanders,
supra note 53, at 215-17 (discussing the possible application of unfair competition, right
of privacy and right of publicity in the digital sampling context); Moglovkln, supra note
47, at 162-69 (analyzing the potential for digital sampling infringement claims under un-
fair competition and right of publicity).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
78. Id.
79. H.R. REPT. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5721.
80. Id.
81. 3 MELVI.LE B. NaffMMA & DAVID NIMMut, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01 [A],
at 13-5 (1991).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
83. H.R. REP. NO. 487, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. reprinted tit 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566,
1272 [Vol. 42:1261
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interest in the copyright. Generally, the artist's rights will be bar-
gamed away during the recording contract negotiating process.8
Similarly, engineers and producers may be involved in a
work-for-hire arrangement. s In many situations, the record com-
pany will be the sole owner of the copyright interest. 6
2. Copying
In order to be successful in an infringement action, the plain-
tiff must prove that the defendant copied the plaintiff's work.
Copying can be proven either directly or indirectly 87 Direct proof
includes an admissions by the defendant that he or she copied the
work, or testimony by someone who sees the defendant copy the
work.8 Indirect proof, on the other hand, requires evidence show-
mg that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's copyrighted
work and that the works contain similarities which would not have
occurred if the protected work had not been copied.89
1570.
84. See generally BASKERVILLE, supra note 55, at 275-93 (explaining artist recording
contracts). The record company may own only the actual sound recording. Ownership of
the composition (the song itself) may be vested solely in the composer if the composer
has not bargained away those rights. Id. at 85-86.
In addition, the record company cannot own a performer's "style," as style cannot be
protected under copyright law.
85. See generally id. at 88-89 (explaining work made for hire and its applicability in
the music industry).
86. See McGivern, supra note 48, at 1730.
Record company ownership of copyrights presents an interesting situation. The trend
in the recording industry between 1962 and 1986 was toward large company ownership
and affiliation. DONALD E. BIEDERMAN, ET AL., LAW AND BuSINESs oF THE ENTERTAIN-
MENT INDUSTRIES 204 (1987). In 1987, four major record labels controlled nearly 70% of
the market for records distributed in the United States. Id. Many of the large record com-
pames release records not only on their own labels, but on smaller affiliate labels as well.
Id.
With a few companies controlling the market, it is likely that the record companies
may actually be sampling from their own albums or the albums of affiliates. See Gordon
& Sanders, supra note 53, at 218 (explaining that "today's plaintiff is often tomorrow's
sampler."). There is a strong likelihood that sampling infringement cases will seldom be
brought either because a record company sampled from its own recordings or because the
person who claims the infringement is unable to bring suit because of the "clean hands
doctrine." Id. For a discussion of the clean hands doctrine, see infra text accompanying
notes 161-63.
However, in the past few years many new labels have emerged. Michael Leu, Can
All Those Upstart Record Labels Survive?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, § 3, at 5. The role
of these new companies in sampling litigation has yet to be defined.
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3. Unlawful Appropriation
Once the plaintiff has successfully established ownership,
access and copying, the plaintiff must further show that the
defendant's use is "substantial and material enough to consti-
tute an unlawful appropriation 190 Use of another's work, in
some circumstances, is permissible;" the plaintiff must show that
m his or her particular case it is not permissible.
Under present law, whether the copying is substantial and
material so as to constitute an infringement would be determined
according to a standard called "substantial similarity "92 The sub-
stantial similarity standard is vague at best.93 Substantial similarity
has been described as "somewhere between no similarity and literal
similarity "' Additionally, one commentator stated that the deter-
mination of substantial similarity "presents one of the most difficult
questions in copyright law "95
Substantial similarity has traditionally been determined by
using the impressions of the "lay listener."'  The test for in-
fringement is more than simply a cluantitative analysis, it is also
qualitative. 97 The amount of similarity required "depends initially
on what is protected in plaintiff's work and then on the impression
made by the protected material upon the 'ordinary observer' for
whose primary benefit the work has been created." 98 In digital
sampling infringement actions, the entire work has not been cop-
ied." Usually only a few seconds of the work are sampled."
90. Id. at 196 (discussing standard of proof for infringement cases).
9I. Use is permissible in cases where the source is a work in the public domain or
where the defendant has independently created the copied work. But see Bright Tunes
Music Corp. v. Hamsongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding in-
fringement notwithstanding George Harrison's defense of unconscious copying from the
song He's So Fine).
92. NiMMlER & NiMMER, supra note 8i, § I3.03[A], at 23 (discussing the "general
nature of substantial similarity").
93. ld. § I3.03[A], at 24.
94. Michael V Francis, Note, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Replacement of
Arnstem v. Porter - A More Comprehensive Use of Expert Testimony and the Implemen-
tation of an "Actual Audience" Test, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 493, 505 (1990) (advocating a
"more comprehensive use of expert witnesses in copyright infringement case" Id. at 497).
95. NiMMER & NIMMER, supra note 81, § 13.03 [A], at 23.
96. Arnstem v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
97. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding incor-
porating of 4.3% of quotations from interviews printed in another book fair use), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
98. PATRY, supra note 70, at 199 (discussing the substantiality requrement).
99. Johnson, supra note 29, at 165 (asserting that since small quantities of sound are
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Most digital sampling infringements would be classified as "frag-
mented literal similarity "'10 Fragmented literal similarity is a
phrase which refers to "verbatim" copying of certain sections of
the original work, as opposed to copying the entire work."~
The standard used in judging cases involving fragmented liter-
al similarity is usually qualitative. In other words, "[e]ven if the
similar material is quantitatively small, if it is qualitatively impor-
tant, the trier of fact may properly find substantial similarity ,,I0a
One commentator has articulated the standard as follows:
[T]he court should determine whether the defendant appro-
priated [1] "the meritorious part of the song," or [2] "mate-
rial of substance and value in plaintiff's work," or [3] "the
very part that makes [the complaining work] popular
and valuable," or [4] "that portion of [the complaining
work] upon which its popular appeal, and hence, its com-
mercial success depends," or [5] "what is pleasing to the
ears of lay listeners." If the most important part of the
plaintiff's composition, artistically speaking, is but a short
portion of the piece, it would hardly be conducive to the
promotion of the arts to deny plaintiff protection for his
artistic kernel simply because he surrounded it with a great
deal of less artistic chaff."0°
Commentators have suggested that this standard should be used
for digital sampling."5 The theory behind this standard is that the
copied, establishing substantial similarity will be the most difficult problem for plaintiffs
attempting to prove copyright infringement in sound recordings by digital sampling).
100. Id. at 153-54 (stating that samples generally range in length from less than a sec-
ond to twenty-five seconds).
101. NiMMR & NMMER, supra note 81, § 13.03 [A][2], at 35.
102. Id.
103. Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165, 1176 (D. Colo. 1988) (granting the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that, although the defendant's work
was similar to-the plaintiff's and the defendant used some of the same words as the
plaintiff, an ordinary observer could not find that the defendant's videotapes infringed the
plaintiff's copyright on its travel gude).
104. Jeffrey Sherman, Note, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Requirement of Sub-
stantial Similarity, 22 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 81, 104 (1977) (citing [1] Northern
Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); [2] 1
MELVILLE B. NIMSMR, NINER ON COPYRIGHT § 143.563 (1971); [3] Johns & Johns
Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282, 283 (8th Cir. 19 9); [4] Robert-
son v. Batten, Barton, Durstein & Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp 795, 798 (S.D. Cal. 1944);
Armstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd on rehearing, 158 F.2d 795
(2d Cir. 1946)).'
105. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 167; see also McGraw, supra note 3, at 162-65;
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copying of even small portions of a piece can harm the
plaintiff.'06 One commentator who advocates use of the standard
described above, cites the example of distinctive rhythmic patterns
called "hooks."' 7  Although distinctive rhythms are not
copyrightable,08 the sonic expression of the rhythms is important
to the overall recording and are identifiable as a part of that re-
cording."° The same commentator expresses the view that "dupli-
cating the identifiable portions of the rhythmic sounds and patterns
may constitute an infringement of the sound recording copy-
right."' 1
0
Commentators have also proposed a "recognizability test.""'
This test is determined by answering the following question: "Is
the defendant's product in any way recognizable to any of the
copyrighted works found in the plaintiff's product?""2 The pur-
pose of this proposed test is to address the issues of fragmented
literal similarity and electronic alteration of samples." 3 In theory,
the test seems viable. One shortcoming of the test, however, is that
if the sample is not recognizable, it is likely the suit will never be
brought in the first place.
C. Derivative Work
A right under current copyright law important for determining
the fate of digital sampling from preexisting works is the right to
prepare derivative works. A derivative work, as defined in section
101 of the Copyright Act, is "a work based upon one or more
Newton, supra note 28, at 705-09; J.C. Thorn, Comment, Digital Sampling: Old Fash-
ioned Piracy Dressed Up in Sleek New Technology, 8 LOYOLA ENT. L.J. 297, 325-30
(1988). Judith Greenberg Finell, a noted musicologist and expert witness in copyright liti-
gation, advocates a similar standard and explains how it could be used in the digital sam-
pling context. Judith G. Finell, How a Musicologist Views Digital Sampling Issues, N.Y.
L.J., May 22, 1992, at 5.
106. Id. at 328.
107. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 167.
108. Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distributing Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
109. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 167.
110. Id.
111. Thorn, supra note 105, at 328-29; see also Ronald M. Wells, Comment, You Can't
Always Get What You Want but Digital Sampling Cati Get What You Need!, 22 AKRON
L. REV. 691, 705 (1989) (advocating the recognizability test as a means of protecting the
average musician).
112. Thorn, supra note 105, at 329.
113. Wells, supra note III, at 704-05.
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preexisting works, such as a condensation, or any other form
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted."'1 14 Sec-
tion 114(b) 115 grants the owner of a copyright in a sound record-
ing the exclusive right, under section 106(2),16 to prepare deriva-
tive works of the sound recording." 7
It has been argued that digital samples taken from preexisting
works are derivative works of the sound recording from which they
are sampled."' In order to escape the derivative work classifica-
tion, the sample would have to be comprised "entirely of an inde-
pendent fixation of other sounds,""I 9 rather than the sounds on
the existing recording. By definition, sounds that are sampled from
an existing recording are recorded from that recording.O2O Al-
though these sounds might be altered by the sampling musician
before or after the sampling process,' this can be of no comfort
to the sampling musician because the definition of derivative work
specifically recognizes that "[a] work consisting of editorial revi-
sions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative
work' '12
It is likely that digital samples may, under present law, be
characterized as derivative works. It is possible that the samples
may be considered de mninimis if the sample lengths are short
enough.'23 Copyright law should be amended to provide an ex-
ception to the derivative work doctrine for digital samples.
124
114. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
117. Section 114 provides in pertinent part:
(b) The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording
under clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative
work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged,
remixed, or other wise altered in sequence or quality. The exclusive rights of
the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) do not
extend to the malang or duplication of another sound recording that consists
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds
imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.
17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
118. Newton, supra note 28, at 703.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
120. See supra notes 11-29 and accompanying text (explaining the digital sampling pro-
cess).
121. See NEWQUIST, supra note 8, at 184.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
123. Newton, supra note 28, at 705.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 178-82.
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Ill. DEFENSES FOR AN INFRINGEMENT ACTION
A. Fair Use
Fair use is an affirmative defense that might be used by defen-
dants in digital sampling infringement actions. Fair use has been
defined as "a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to
use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the
owner ,125 Fair use started out as a common law defense,
but the doctrine is now codified in the 1976 Copyright Act.
2 6
Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists the following non-exclusive
factors to be considered when the doctrine is applied:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work." 7
While these factors constitute the minimum considerations allowed
when determining fair use, other factors may be considered.
Congress articulated examples falling within the fair use doc-
trine in the following manner: "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching , scholar-
ship or research, is not an infringement of copyright."12 ' Digital
sampling, depending on the context in which the sampling is used,
may be difficult to fit into the specified uses. If the sample is used
as a commentary or parody, the use might be acceptable under the
articulated uses. 2 9 Congress' use of the words "such as" suggests
125. HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944).
For discussion of the applicability of the fair use doctrine in other types of infringement
cases, see Sitzer, supra note 62, at 394-96.
126. PATRY, supra note 70, at 239-40. The Fair Use Doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 107.
127. Id.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
129. Some musicians, such as -Weird Al Yankovic," have performed on musical parody
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that the list of uses is a list of examples, not an exhaustive list of
permitted purposes for use of a work under the fair use doctrine.
1. Purpose and Character of Use
Defendants accused of illicit sampling who wish to assert a fair
use defense are required to explain the purpose and character of
the use of the copyrighted material.' 30 The fair use provision ex-
plicitly distinguishes between primarily commercial uses and schol-
arly or educational pursuits.' 3 ' Commercial uses will most likely
constitute the majority of digital sampling. When the use is com-
mercial, there are two presumptions that the defendant must rebut:
(1) every commercial use is not a fair use; and (2) every commer-
cial use results in harm to the potential market for the copyrighted
work.131 It is possible that the defendant could rebut the first
presumption by asserting that the use, though commercial, is fair
because it "pays homage" to the original work. 33 Another way to
rebut the presumption might be to argue that the work has been
altered so that it differs radically from the original; as a result,
there is no harm to the plaintiff."M To rebut the second presump-
tion, the defendant can argue that his or her use of the copyrighted
material actually results in market gain, reviving interest and in-
creasing sales of the original work.
135
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The next factor to be considered in the fair use analysis is the
nature of the copyrighted work. The defendant will face difficulties
under this factor as well. Generally, creative works are less subject
to fair use than informational works. 36 Because the copyrighted
albums. Yankovic's albums take existing songs and change the lyrics to make the songs
humorous. E.g. AL YANKOViC, DARE TO BE STUPID (Rock and Roll Records 1989).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
131. Id.
132. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)
(finding even unauthonzed home "timeshifting" of copyrighted programs on videotape
records is fair use).
133. See Gordon & Sanders, supra note 53, at 209.
134. For discussion of electronic alteration, see ifra text accompanying notes 155-60.
135. See Gordon & Sanders, supra note 53, at 209.
136. Diamond v. Am-Law Pub., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984); see also PATRY,
supra note 70, at 249 (explaining that although the reasoning for the policy is unclear,
the fair use defense is not as readily available for -[w]orks of an entertainment na-
ture ").
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work sampled is usually an album that was originally produced for
entertainment purposes, a defendant is unlikely to prevail under this
factor.
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third factor considered in assessing a fair use defense is
"the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole."' 37 Because digital samples vary
from milliseconds to minutes, 38 the defendant's success may de-
pend upon how much of the underlying work was sampled. Most
samples are only a few seconds long. 139 If the defendant used
only a few notes, or one instrument of many included on the
plaintiff's recording, the defendant may prevail on this factor.
4. Effect on the Market or Value of the Copyrighted Work
The fourth factor considered by the court in a fair use situation
is "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work."' 4 This factor has been called "the single
most important element of fair use."' 4' The inquiry made under
this factor: "whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the
sort engaged in by the defendant (whether in fact engaged in by
the defendant or by others) would result in a substantially adverse
impact on the potential market for or value of the plaintiff's pres-
ent work."'
142
The defendant can argue that the use of the sample does not
harm the market for the plaintiff's work. 143 In many cases, the
defendant's use of the sample is in a completely different context
than the plaintiffs original work. For example, a rap artist might
use a song of a different genre as a background rhythm in
creataing a new rap work. Often times, the songs used are several
137. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
138. See supra text accompanying note 28.
139. See supra text accompanying note 29.
140. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
141. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
142. ND&,MER & NIMMER, supra note 81, § 13.03 [A][4], at 79.
143. See Gordon & Sanders, supra note 53, at 209 (discussing the claim by one record
company executive that sales of James Brown recordings have probably increased since
they have become widely sampled); Lionel Bentley, Sampling and Copyright. Is the Law
on the Right Track? (pt. 2), 1989 J. BUS. L. 405, 412 (arguing that sampling should be
permitted because the small amount that is taken does not harm the original creator).
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years old and are no longer commercially popular. The rap artist,
by using the sample, may actually revive the sampled song's popu-
larity 144 Given the opposing arguments, the court's task is to
balance the interests of the plaintiff and defendant to determine
whether the use of the protected material was fair.
B. De Minimis
Even if a plaintiff is able to prove that the defendant copied
from the plaintiffs copyrighted work, the defendant may be able to
argue that the copying was de minimis. If the sample is of a small
portion of the plaintiff's work, it may be de minmits, and will not
be protected under the copyright laws.14
The trial court in United States v. Taxe146 indicated that in
some cases, "trivial re-recordings might very well be held to be
such an insubstantial taking as not to infringe." 47 Taxe involved
actual re-recordings of entire songs from commercially released
albums. The defendants purchased stereo recordings manufactured
by major record companies in retail stores. 14  They then took
these recordings and re-recorded them making minor changes such
as increasing or decreasing the recording speed, adding reverbera-
tion, reducing the volume of certain portions and adding additional
sounds using synthesizers. 149 The tapes made by the defendants
were then sold through a national advertising campaign."5t These
tapes were represented to the public as the original recordings.'
The trial court found that the recordings made by the defen-
dants in Taxe were not de innnmus because the entire song was re-
recorded.'52 Although the Taxe case was decided in the mid-sev-
enties, ten years before digital sampling became popular, the court
indicated that de innmms copying was not the type of use that
144. See id. But see Tomsho, supra note 1, at BI (explaining the process undertaken by
PolyGram Records, which owns the nghts to many of James Brown's recordings, to po-
lice unauthonzed sampling uses of the singer's trademark scream).
145. See Johnson, supra note 29, at 168.
146. 380 F. Supp. i010 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part,
540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
147. Id. at 1014.
148. United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. dented, 429 U.S.
1040 (1977).
149. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. at 1012.
150. Taxe, 540 F.2d at 964.
151. Id.
152. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. at 1017.
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Congress intended to target with the Sound Recording Amend-
ment.'53 The Taxe court recognized that the purpose of the statute
was to prevent piracy 154 Thus, a court today might follow the
Taxe rationale find that a short digital sample is a de minimus use
rather than piracy
C. Alteration of the Sample
A defendant in a copyright infringement suit who has sampled
sounds from the plaintiff's copyrighted work, then altered these
sounds before using them, may claim that this alteration has
changed the sound to the extent that there is no substantial similar-
ity between the two.
Taxe addressed the issue of electronic alteration. The defen-
dants in Taxe were convicted of willful infringement of copyrights
for profit and conspiracy 155 The trial court convicted the defen-
dants, holding that there was an infringement because the tapes
were re-recordings of copyrighted material.55 The court further
stated, in dictum, that "comprehensive changes might be
held to be so far from what Congress intended to prohibit as to
not constitute an infringement."15 1 It was unnecessary for the
court to consider comprehensive alterations in this case because the
alterations made by the defendants were intentionally inaudible.'
5 8
The appellate court, reviewing the trial court's jury instructions,
held that the jury instruction "went beyond the law insofar as it
purported to characterize any and all re-recordings as infringe-
ments 11159 The court also stated that a copyright owner's
right "can be infringed" by an unauthorized re-recording which,
despite changes in the sounds duplicated, results in a work of
'substantial similarity. "',,o
The statements of both the trial and appellate courts in Taxe
imply that a defense of alteration exists. In order to prevail under
an alteration defense, the defendant's work must not be substantial-
153. Id. at 1014.
154. Id.
155. Taxe, 540 F.2d at 964.
156. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. at 1014 ("So long as the allegedly infringing work is a prod-
uct of re-recording, rather than an independent production, an infringement exists.-).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1013.
159. Taxe, 540 F.2d at 965.
160. Id. at 965 n.2 (emphasis added).
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ly similar to the copyrighted work.
This defense would be helpful in digital sampling cases. Most
digital sampling cases fall into the exceptions laid out by the Taxe
courts because generally, in digital sampling cases, a sound is
sampled, altered and used in a completely different context than
the copyrighted work. Digital sampling cases would not include the
representation that the work is the original, as did the tapes in
Taxe.
D. Clean Hands Doctrine
One commentator has suggested the use of a "clean hands"
doctrine for copyright infringement cases involving digital sam-
pling.'61 This doctrine would operate as a form of estoppel. Any
artist who samples the sounds of other artists without authorization
would be estopped from asserting a claim against a person who
similarly infringes on that artist's work.6 2 This doctrine could
also be extended to include record companies that sample other
companies' works, because very often the record companies own
the copyright interest. 63
IV A DEFINITE STANDARD NEEDED IN SAMPLING
INFRINGEMENT CASES
The standards discussed in this note for determining whether
the use of a digital sample violates copyright law are substantial
similarity' 64 and recognizability 165 These standards however, do
not adequately meet the needs of the music industry These stan-
dards do not allow one to predict the consequences of using digital
samples because they are applied only during litigation. Many of
the samples taken from other artists' works are too short or altered
in such a way so that they are no longer recognizable; therefore, a
suit may never be brought. Most artists and record companies
prefer to avoid the expense and publicity brought by litigation."
In order to avoid litigation, artists need a way to predict what
types of behavior will subject them to a law suit. 67
161. See McGraw, supra note 3, at 168.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 86.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 92-110.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
166. Gordon & Sanders, supra note 53, at 218.
167. See NEWQUIST, supra note 8, at 125-27 (explaining the confusion in the music in-
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The substantial similarity standard is vague 68 and has never
been used in a digital sampling case. The musician subject to a
lawsuit must rely on a determination which has been called "one
of the most difficult questions in copyright law ,169 Musicians
therefore, have no guidance from either the courts or the legislature
as to how this test should be applied in the sampling context.
The recognizability test does not offer predictability to the
musician either. The recognizability standard would be subject to
the musical knowledge and tastes of the jury For example, a jury
in New York city may react very differently to a piece, or more
readily recognize an artist, than a jury in a less musically diverse
area.
The inability of a musician to predict what types of sampling
will be permitted and the lack of guiding case law indicate that a
new standard is needed. 70 One commentator has suggested that
changing copyright and patent law for the new technologies should
be developed by the courts, not the legislature.17 1 That commen-
tator asserts that the changing technologies do not necessarily re-
quire new laws. He identifies the challenge of intellectual property
as "not deciding how to treat new creations that are sut generts.
Rather, it is determining whether a new thing is like an old. Put
another way, it is the classic problem of the common law- treating
like cases alike."'
172
This problem may necessitate judicial activism because Con-
gress often does not anticipate new technology, or respond rapidly
enough once new technology develops.7 3 It has been argued that
dustry as to what sampling uses are allowed).
168. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
169. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 81, § 13.03 [A], at 23.
170. In Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), the court addressed only the issue of ownership and essentially deemed
digital sampling a form of theft without addressing its possible creative merits. Grand
Upright, however, was a hearing on a preliminary injunction, not an actual trial of the
issues. The case later settled. Grand Upright also has several unique facts that distinguish
it from the typical case. The defendants sought permission to use the underlying work;
permission was specifically demed. Further, the sampled portion was a substantial part of
the new work. It was used repeatedly throughout the new work and constituted most of
the work. See Robert G. Sugarman & Joseph P. Salvo, Sampling Litigation in the Line
Light, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at I (analyzing Grand Upright).
171. Dan Rosen, A Coniion Law for the Ages of Intellectual Property, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 769 (1984).
172. Id. at 772.




judicial activism is a first step, then the legislature is free to alter
the doctrines set out by the courts. 74
In the case of digital sampling, the courts have not had much
opportunity to act because few suits have actually made it into a
courtroom. 7 Digital sampling technology has been in existence
since the 1970's and is rapidly growing in popularity as the price
of a professional quality sampler has dropped considerably For
example, a Fairlight sampler cost $30,000 to $150,000 in 1975
while today one can purchase a comparable unit for less than
$1,500.176 Digital sampling technology is available in inexpensive,
unsophisticated samplers for under $100, and it is also used for
many electronic products in the home."7 Digital sampling tech-
nology is so pervasive in our society that it cannot be ignored.
Congress therefore, must act to define the copyright law standards
for the proper use of digital samples.
V PROPOSED CHANGES IN COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Solution
Determining what types and amounts of digital sampling Con-
gress should allow artists to use is difficult. Any standard is likely
to be arbitrary, yet an arbitrary standard is better than no standard
at all. An arbitrary standard permitting samples of existing works
up to a specified duration enables musicians to use many sources
as building blocks for their creativity, while retaining the underly-
ing purposes of copyright.
Congress should change copyright law by creating a new stan-
dard that allows digital sampling in limited circumstances. This
new law would permit musicians to incorporate short samples of
existing works into the musician's original works, without classi-
fying these new works as derivative. In creating a new standard,
Congress should enlist the aid of experts in the recording industry
174. Id. at 781.
175. Most digital sampling cases settle before trial, if they are even brought. However,
the Southern District of New York addressed sampling issues in Grand Upright Music
Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), in the context of
a preliminary injunction hearing. The case later settled. Another case, Turf N' Rumble
Management, Inc. v. Def Jam Recordings, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 8637 (iAM) (S.D.N.Y.) was
filed December 23, 1991, but has not yet gone to trial.
176. Moglovkan, supra note 47, at 140.
177. Id.
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to help determine the appropriate permissible sample length. Ideal-
ly, the sample length should be short, requiring a musician using
the sample to expend a substantial amount of labor in order to use
the sample in a new work.
This new legislation should also require musicians sampling
from other musicians' works to notify the authors of the original
works that a sample is being used, and offer the authors the option
of having their sampled work acknowledged on the sampling
musician's album cover. This notice requirement and album cover
credit option will ensure that an artist receives proper artistic credit
and will prevent musicians from misrepresenting that the artist
whose work was sampled actually performed on, or supported the
production of, the album.
B. The Proposed Sampling Act
§1 PERMITTED USE OF SAMPLES FROM EXISTING SOUND
RECORDINGS
A sound recording containing one or more portions of not
more than three seconds each in duration'78 sampled from one or
more existing sound recordings does not infringe on the copyright
of the existing sound recording(s) provided that the notice provi-
sion of §2, and the album cover credit option provision of §3 are
satisfied.
(a) For purposes of this section, the term "sample" refers to
copying by either digital or analog means from an existing sound
recording.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "sound recording"
refers to any works that result from the fixation of a series of
musical, spoken, or other sounds, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as discs, tapes, or other phonorecords, in
which they are embodied.
79
178. The sample duration length of three seconds is an estimation of an approximate
time. Congress would need to consult with experts in the industry to determine an appro-
pnate duration.
179. This definition is taken from 17 U.S.C. § 101. Note, however, that the words -but
not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work" have
been removed from the original definition for purposes of the proposed section. The ex-
ception for motion picture has been removed because it is important to give an artist as
much raw matenal as possible in which to find creative inspiration. See, e.g., Allan
Kozinn, Having Fun with Jack Benny, for Opera's Sake, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1989, C-
15 (describing an electronic music opera based on samples taken from episodes of The
Jack Benny Show composed by John Moran).
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(c) Exception to the general rule: A sound recording will in-
fringe on the copyright of an existing sound recording where it
consists substantially of samples of one existing sound recording,
and is, in effect, a copy of the existing work.
(d) Sound recordings that use samples from an existing sound
recording, where such samples exceed three seconds in duration,
infringe on the copyright protection of the existing sound record-
Mg.
(e) Sound recordings which use samples from an existing
sound recording, where such samples are used without the statuton-
ly required notice to the copyright holder of the existing -sound
recording, infringe on the copyright protection of the existing
sound recording.
(f) Sound recordings which use digital samples under this sec-
tion, shall not be considered to be derivative works of the original
sound recording, under section 106 (2) of this title.
§2 NOTICE PROVISION
A person wishing to use samples from an existing sound re-
cording protected by copyright must notify the copyright holder of
the intent to use samples from the copyrighted material.
(a) Notice must include the following:
(1) name of the person(s) or entity that sampled the work;
(2) a description of the material sampled; and
(3) a fair explanation of the context in which the sample will
be used.is
(b) Notice must be given at least sixty days... prior to the
public exposition or release of the sound recording containing the
sample(s).
180. A "fair explanation" of the context is required. This standard is less onerous than
the current "system" where artists essentially are required to record the entire work and
send it to the desired licensee. The current system is prohibitively expensive, especially
where consent is then refused after tens of thousands of dollars are spent recording. See
Sheila Rule, Record Conipantes-Are Challenging "Sampling In Rap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
1992, at C-13. The proposed requirements would enable the artist to use the existing
work without spending thousands to produce a work, only to have permission refused.
181. The 60-day notice provision could be adopted by Congress after consultation with
experts from the recording industry in order to meet the needs of the industry. A longer
time may be required. The purpose of this provision is to insure that the copyright holder
is given adequate notice of the sample's use and will have adequate time to determine if
the album cover credit option will be exercised.
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§3 ALBUM COVER CREDIT OPTION PROVISION
At the option of the copyright holder of the existing sound
recording that has been sampled, the album cover of the sound re-
cording using samples from such recordings must include an ac-
knowledgement of the use of the sample and its source.
(a) The acknowledgement must:
(1) be of a typeface size not smaller than the smallest type-
face of the other written material on the album cover,
(2) clearly indicate which recordings have used material sam-
pled from existing sound recordings, and
(3) identify the source of all material sampled from existing
sound recordings.
(b) The copyright holder of the existing sound recording may
express intent to exercise the option of having the sampled material
acknowledged on the album cover until thirty days182 prior to the
public exposition or release of the sound recording containing the
sample.
(c) If the intent to exercise the option is not expressed at least
thirty days prior to the public exposition or release of the sound
recording containing the sample, the option will be considered
waived.
C. Justification for the Proposed Legislation
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to create
intellectual property law is3 Intellectual property rights, such as
copyrights, are granted "not as rewards but as inducements to
authors and inventors to create and disseminate intellectual
works."Is 4 In theory, the limited monopoly granted to creators
enables the creation and dissemination of works through mass
production to be economically feasible by preventing competition
from inexpensive copies of the work once the first production has
been released.'
182. The time limit of this provision would be determined by Congress after consulta-
tion with experts in the industry. The purpose of this time limit is to give the company
releasing the album containing the sample adequate time to design the album cover.
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also supra text accompanying notes 60-68.
184. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE
OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 7 (1986).
185. The validity and necessity of this theory has been questioned. See Breyer, supra




Allowing musicians to sample another artist's work is consis-
tent with this goal of intellectual property When a musician sam-
ples a small portion from an existing recording and uses the sam-
ple in a different musical piece, the musician is not copying the
piece wholesale and passing it off as his own. Rather, the musician
is creating an original composition and is simply using the sample
as one of the instruments for the new work. The proposed legisla-
tion provides for a sample time short enough to ensure that there
is no confusion between the sampled and new compositions. By
requiring that the author of the sampled works be given the option
of album credit, the proposed law also minimizes the risk of mis-
representation or confusion. The proposed legislation therefore,
balances the goals of copyright and the interests of the parties.
New creations are encouraged because musicians are given a virtu-
ally limitless supply of raw material while existing works remain
protected from outright pirating of the entire song.
Finally, the proposed legislation is consistent with some of the
theories offered to justify intellectual property One commentator
suggests that intellectual property can be justified in light of
Lockean and Hegelian theories. 186 In the Hughes article, the test
applied is "whether traditional theories of property are applicable to
the very untraditional field of intellectual goods."' 87
1. Locke's Property Theory
The first theory examined in the article to justify intellectual
property is Locke's property theory 188 Locke's property theory
begins with the premise that "God" gave the world to all people,
or to mankind in common.189 People have property rights in their
own person and the labors of their bodies."9 Whatever a person
removes from its natural state and mixes with that person's labor
becomes that person's property 191
This theory presupposes the availability of adequate comparable
186. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. LJ. 287 (1988).
187. Id. at 288.
188. See id. at 296-330.
The Lockean theory has also been used as the basis for a discussion of the appor-
tionment of profits in musical composition plagiarism cases. See Note, An Improved
Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 421, 447 (1988).
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resources, a state that has been called the "enough and as good
condition."' 92 The enough and as good condition has been de-
scribed as "an equal opportunity provision" 93 providing that
"each person can get as much as he is willing to work for without
creating meritocratic competition against others.""9  Locke's theo-
ry however, is limited by what has been called the "non-waste con-
dition"' 95 which "prohibits the accumulation of so much property
that some is destroyed without being used.""9
The first part of Locke's theory discussed is the "labor justifi-
cation theory 197 This theory is subject to two interpretations:
instrumental and normative."' The instrumental interpretation is
that society must reward labor with property in order to get la-
bor.' 99 The normative interpretation provides that labor should be
rewarded.2"o
The first interpretation of the labor justification theory is the
"avoidance" view of labor."' To proceed under this theory it is
necessary to assume that ideas, or intellectual goods require labor
to produce.2" The premise of this interpretation is that labor is
unpleasant, and therefore, should be rewarded in order to induce
people to perform this labor. 3 This interpretation justifies labor
on the individual level. In other words the individual feels justified
because he receives something in return for the pains of his la-
bor.204
The proposed legislation is consistent with this interpretation.
The creator of the original sound recording is being rewarded for
performing "labor" on the original work as before. New works,
however, are encouraged because the labor required to create these
192. See id. (disavowing competing claims for natural resources "at least where there is
enough and as good left in common for others").
193. Hughes, supra note 186, at 297-98.
194. Id. at 298.
195. Id. at 298 (emphasis omitted).
196. Id., see LOCKE-, supra note 189, 37 ("but if [resources] perished in his posses-
sion without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrefied before he could
spend it, he offended against the common law of nature, and was liable to be punished").
197. See Hughes, supra note 186, at 300-15.
198. Id. at 296.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 302-05 (applying the avoidance view of labor to intellectual property).
202. See id. at 300-02 (concluding through his analysis that idea production does require
labor).
203. Id. at 302-03.
204. Id. at 310.
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works is easier in some ways when sampling is permitted. By
allowing a predetermined sample length, the musician will create
because there is the assurance of a reward instead of a punishment.
At present, because there is no clear definition of what sampling
uses are allowed, musicians may be afraid to create freely for fear
of breaking the law.2°5 In addition, if a musician is permitted to
use existing works, there will be more raw material to mspire
creativity, thereby making the creative process less labor-intensive.
Locke's labor justification theory is also examined under an
interpretation called the "labor desert" or "value added" theory 206
The premise of the value added theory is that "labor often creates
social value, and it is this production of social value that
'deserves' reward, not the labor that produced it."207 This theory
is an instrumentalist argument which justifies property on a social
level.20 It states that people will contribute to the good of soci-
ety, or the "common," if they personally receive some of the val-
ue.2°9 In other words, society must reward people in order to mo-
tivate them to contribute to the common.
When justifying copyright in terms of the value added theory,
it is necessary to note that copyright as a whole may be inconsis-
tent with this theory because there is no requirement of "value" for
copyrighted works.210 An author can copyright a work that is
never disseminated to the public, and therefore never becomes part
of the "common."21' If it does not add a "social value," then, un-
der an instrumentalist theory it does not have to be rewarded. 2
It has been suggested that intellectual property might neverthe-
less be justified under the value added theory if the "net gain"
achieved by allowing copyright of works is examined.2 3 In other
words, some individual works of intellectual property may be so-
cially valueless, but as long as the intellectual property system as a
205. Trus fear has become more realistic in light of Grand Upright Music Ltd. v.
Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In that case, the judge
referred the matter to the United States Attorney for possible criminal prosecution. For
analysis of the possible criminal prosecution, see Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 170.
206. Id. at 305-10.
207. Id. at 305.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 305-06.
210. Id. at 308-09.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 306-09 (relating the value added theory to intellectual property and de-
termiung that it can nevertheless be applicable even if the creation has no "value").
213. Id. at 310.
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whole contributes a net gain to society, then the system is worth-
while.
14
The proposed legislation can be justified under the value added
theory as well. The goal of the value added theory is to reward
and encourage activities that add social value. The proposed law
encourages the creation of new works, and in the end, is likely to
increase the number of sound recordings created. It is unlikely that
musicians currently creating new works will stop recording if digi-
tal sampling of existing works is permitted. They will continue to
record even if their works can be sampled because they too will
receive benefits.
In his article, Professor Breyer suggests that if copyright were
abolished in the publishing industry, book production would not be
seriously threatened because there remain advantages to publishing,
even without copyright protection.1 5 Similarly, if sampling were
permitted, musicians would continue to record in order to receive
benefits such as economic gain, artistic achievement, social stature,
and personal satisfaction.
The musicians who currently record are likely to continue to
record and new musicians are being encouraged to record; as a
result, there is likely to be a "net gain" in the number of works
produced and disseminated to the public, thereby adding to the
common. This is consistent with the purpose of copyright under the
value added theory The musicians who created the underlying
works will continue to create because they will receive benefits
from their creations. In addition, new musicians will begin to cre-
ate because they will be permitted to use the tools they desire
(existing works). With the advantage of predictability from a prede-
termined permissible sample length, musicians can conform their
behavior to the law so that they can create without fear of punish-
ment.
2. Hegel's Personality Theory
Hegel's personality theory is also used to justify intellectual
property26 Hegelian philosophy regards the individual's will as
214. Id.
215. Breyer, supra note 58, at 293-308 (suggesting that countervailing forces such as
the advantage of lead time would encourage publishers to publish books before their
competitors).
216. See generally Hughes, supra note 186, at 331-65 (analyzing intellectual property in
light of Hegel's personality theory).
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the center of her existence.217 Personality, under this philosophy,
is an outward (external) manifestation of will, or "the will's strug-
gle to actualize itself."2"'
Under the personality theory, "[p]roperty becomes [an] expres-
sion of the will, a part of personality T,219 The Hegelian the-
ory prescribes that "labor is often the means by which the will
occupies an object,"' 0 but that labor is not necessary 22' The
three ways in which will may occupy an object are by "physically
seizing it, imposing a form upon it, and marking it." '  Rather
than focusing solely on labor, the personality theory "focuses on
where a commodity ends up, not where and how it starts
out ,,22 This focus reflects the "subjective relationship be-
tween the holder and the thing, not the objective arrangements
surrounding production of the thing."224
The theory becomes somewhat more complicated when applied
to intangibles such as scholarship, talent or spirituality225 Hegel
states that "[a]ttainments, eruditions, talents, and so forth, are, of
course, owned by free mind and are something internal and not
external to it, but even so, by expressing them it may embody
them in something external and alienate them."226  These
alienations are-the creations on which intellectual property is based.
These alienations are problematic under Hegelian philosophy be-
cause Hegel believed that a person could not alienate or surrender
a universal element of that person's self.
27
Hegel maintained that when an artistic work is copied by an-
other artist, the copy "is essentially a product of the copyist's own
mental and technical ability "22 This copy is not considered by
Hegel to infringe on the original artist's property right. A distinc-
tion is drawn, however, between hand-made copies of artistic
217. Id. at 331.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 333.
220. Id. at 334.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 335,
223. Id. (quoting Margaret I. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957,
957 (1982)).
224. ld.
225. See id. at 337 (quoting Hegel's relation of personality and mental traits to will).
226. GEORG HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 43 (T.M. Knox Trans. 1967).
227. Hughes, supra note 186, at 339.
228. HEGEL, supra note 226, at § 68.
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works and mechanical reproductions of books.29 Hegel concluded
that when an author alienates or releases one copy of a work, the
author retains the right to produce duplicate copies.230 This right
is given to the author because "such reproduction is one of the
'universal ways and means of expression which belong to [the
author]."' 23' The copy is sold to the buyer for the personal con-
sumption of the buyer.232 The buyer acquires a copy, then "in-
corporate[s] these ideas into his 'self' ,233
Hegel's theory would support a limited use of digital sampling,
as set out in the proposed legislation. The proposed law imposes
such a limitation on the allowed amount of sampling that a musi-
cian is forced to add in a substantial amount of originality, or
personality The new work will not be merely a mechanical repro-
duction of the original work, but an entirely new piece. This type
of use is supported by Hegel because the mental and technical
abilities of the new author are embodied in the work. The author
of the underlying work still retains the right to make facsimiles of
the original work. The new author, however, incorporates the ideas
into a new work reflecting that author's self, rather than making an
exact duplicate of the original work.
One problem encountered when trying to apply Hegel's person-
ality theory to intellectual property is that some creations seem to
reflect little or none of their creator's personality 234 Some may
argue that when a musician uses a sample of an existing work,
none of that musician's personality is reflected in the sample, and
that under the personality theory, the sample rightfully belongs to
the original artist and cannot be used by anyone but that artist.
This argument however, can be countered by analogy Some
have argued that maps are devoid of personality, and therefore, not
entitled to protection under intellectual property law 235 One com-
mentator however, argues that even though maps consist mostly of
generic, informational material, there are certain factors which
differ from map to map.236 These factors, which include color,
229. Hughes, supra note 186, at 338.
230. Id.




234. Id. at 339.




identifying symbols and presentation of information, make up the
"personality" of the map.'
The same can be said for digital sampling. At first glance, it
appears that copying sounds from an existing recording would not
require the use of personality, but there are many variables in
recording. The sample could be electronically processed using a
number of different signal processing devices, producing effects
such as delay, reverberation and harmonization. 8 Another way
to express personality is through composition. Although the sounds
that are sampled might sound the same, it is not the same compo-
sition. A short portion of a preexisting recording may be used in a
different song, and even in a different style of music.
VI. CONCLUSION
An important policy debate lies ahead concerning digital sam-
pling. Present copyright law does not adequately address the con-
cems of this new technology The existing standard, substantial
similarity, is too vague to be of any aid to musicians who wish to
conform their behavior to the law and avoid litigation. Another
proposed standard, recognizability, is also inadequate because it is
very subjective and does not help a musician to predict what uses
would be allowed by the courts.
Congress must balance the goals of copyright against the inter-
ests of the parties. By adopting the legislation proposed here, Con-
gress can achieve this balance while allowing musicians to sample
small portions of existing works for use as raw material in new
works. The proposed legislation advocates the use of short digital
samples. While encouraging the creation of new works and protect-
mg the integrity of existing works, the proposed legislation also
provides predictability to composers currently unable to assess
whether the use of digital samples is legal.
MARY B. PERCIFULL
237. Id.
238. See generally EARGLE supra note 2, at 183-231 (explaining signal processing de-
vices and their application).
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